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The author clarifies the position of stakeholders under the current law 
before considering the recognition accorded to them by the Company Law 
Review and the recent White Paper, Modernising Company Law.
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I n July 2001, the Company Law Review completed its consultation process to reform the whole structure of company law in the UK (Final Report, July 2001). 
Following the completion of the review process, the 
government released a White Paper (July 16, 2002), and 
invited comments by November 29, 2002. Amongst the 
many issues the Review tackled was the duties of directors, 
a subject so important in the quest to ensure good 
governance within companies. The Review recommended 
(in the Final Report, 3.5-3.11) that the duties of directors 
as currently laid down under the common law should be 
codified in statute. In doing so, the Review effectively 
followed the recommendations of an earlier Law 
Commission Report into directors' duties (Company 
directors: Regulating conflicts of interest and formulating a 
statement of duties, 1999). A statutory statement would give 
directors a clear statement of what their duties are, and so 
bring the law into line with modern business practice and 
accepted standards of behaviour.
The Government agreed with Review's proposal (White 
Paper, Modernising company law, Cm 5553, July 2002, Vol 1, 
Pt 2, 3.2-3.7), and adopted the draft statutory statement 
of directors' duties drawn up by the Review. It intends to 
consult further on a revised draft in due course (White 
Paper, Vol 1, Pt 2, 3.7). It should be noted however that 
the government did not favour an inclusion of duties to 
creditors in the statutory statement (White Paper, Vol 1, 
Pt 2, 3.10). One of the duties of directors, under the new 
framework, will be:
"... to act in the way he decides, in goodjaith, would be 
most likely to promote the success of the company Jor the 
benefit of its members as a whole, and in deciding what 
would be most likely to promote that success, take account in 
goodjaith of all the material Jactors that it is practicable in 
the circumstances Jor him to identify... "
This article will examine, in the light of the above duty,
the position of company stakeholders under the new 
company law framework. It will first clarify their position 
under the current law and then question the 
appropriateness of the recognition which both the Review 
and the government have, under the new framework,
o ' '
accorded to them.
POSITION OF STAKEHOLDERS UNDER 
THE CURRENT LAW
What rights do stakeholders currently have under 
company law, and do directors have a specific duty to take 
their interests into account? The answer is no. Despite 
shifts in public opinion on this matter recently (see, for 
example, the recent public outcry over Railtrack 
concerning the high profits awarded to shareholders at the 
expense of poor service to consumers) the current position 
is effectively that the primary duty of directors is only to 
the body of shareholders as a whole. Whether or not 
directors should owe a duty directly to stakeholders has 
been hotly debated for some time. Indeed company law 
academics hold diverse views insofar as the principle of 
shareholder-primacy is concerned and many have argued 
that company directors have a wider obligation beyond that 
of profit maximization (see for example Dodd, E M, "For 
whom are corporate managers trustees?" (1932) 45 
Harvard Law Review 1145; Berle A A, 'For whom corporate 
managers are trustees', (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1365; 
Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, 'The social responsibility of 
companies', (1985) 15 MULR 4; Stone, C D 'Corporate 
social responsibility; what it might mean if it were really to 
matter' (1986) 71 Iowa Law Review 557).
Official recognition of the interests of company 
stakeholders in the UK has on the whole, been lukewarm. 
This is not to say that the government has been oblivious 
to the needs or interests of stakeholders. On the contrary, 
ministers have from time to time adopted a moral tone 
and issued challenges to the corporate community to be
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more ethical and sensitive to the needs of stakeholders in 
the management of their companies. In October 2001, the 
Minister for Corporate Social Responsibility, Douglas 
Alexander MP, said:
"It is not acceptable jbr a company to make highly priced 
goods Jor highly paid consumers in the developed world by 
ruining the health of children in the sweatshops of the 
developing world. It is not acceptable Jbr a company to make 
beautifulJurnitureJor the homes oj rich Jamilies in the west 
but leave a devastated forest landscape in Brazil. And it is 
clear already that businesses have come to understand the very 
considerable corporate risk involved in such actions" 
(http://www. dti.gov. uk/ministers/archived/alexander2 3 1001. 
html).
However, few in positions of authority have been 
enthusiastic in advocating an extension of the duties of 
directors to persons beyond the body of shareholders. In 
June 2000, the then Secretary of State for Industry, 
Stephen Byers MP (in his speech at the TUC/IPPR Seminar 
on Corporate Governance) recognised that decisions taken 
by companies affected customers, creditors, the 
environment and the wider community, and not just the 
company alone. He rightly pointed out that companies 
needed to be flexible so that they may consider the wider 
interests of the company alongside those of their investors, 
and not merely focus on short term profits. However, he 
did not think that this justified the law imposing on 
directors a specific duty to take these wider interests into 
account. He stressed that it would be difficult for directors 
to take into account all interests if such a duty were 
imposed, as there will always be conflicts of interests which 
it may be difficult, if not impossible to resolve 
(http://www.dti.gov.uk/ministers/archived/byers070600.ht 
ml).
In examining the same issue, the Hampel Committee 
appeared equally ambivalent:
"... to redefine the directors' responsibilities in terms of the 
stakeholders would mean identifying all the various stakeholder 
groups; and deciding the nature and extent of the directors' 
responsibility to each. The result would be that the directors 
were not effectively accountable to anyone since there would be 
no clear yardstick Jor judging their performance... " ('see 
Proctor G and Miles L, Corporate governance, Cavendish, 
2002 at pi89; "Duty, accountability and the Company 
Law Review", (1999) 20 Co Law 233-35).
There is thus no specific duty on directors to take 
stakeholder interests into account. There is nothing 
however, preventing them from doing so. In real terms, 
the function of directors is profit maximisation for their 
shareholders. There was much debate during the Review's
o
consultation process as to whether company law should 
adopt a "pluralist approach" to directors' duties (a 
company should serve a wider range of interests not 
subordinate to that of shareholders, but which are valid in
their own right). The Review rejected this, preferring 
instead an "enlightened shareholder value" approach (that 
the primary role of directors should be to promote the 
success of the company Jbr the benefit of its shareholders as a 
whole, but that they should also recognise, as the 
circumstances require, the company's need to foster 
relationships with odier stakeholders, its need to maintain 
its business reputation and its need to consider the impact 
of its operations on the community and the environment) 
(Final Report, 3.8). The Government White Paper 
endorsed this approach (Vol 1 Pt 2, 3.3, 3.6, Draft 
statement of directors' duties, Sched 2, Vol 2, Principle 2).
What of the attitude of companies themselves? Are they 
on the whole, keen to embrace the interests of 
stakeholders? In 2000, the Prime Minister, Tony Blair MP, 
urged all large UK-listed companies to publish an 
environmental report by the end of 2001. In a speech to 
the CBI in October 2000 he said: "/ am issuing a challenge 
today, to all of the top 350 companies to be publishing annual 
environment reports by the end of 2001 ."
A survey conducted by corporate social responsibility 
consultants Environmental Context and Salter Baxter 
(2000/1) however, showed that the UK's top companies 
had consistently rejected the government's calls to disclose 
environmental and social responsibility information, 
despite the fact that for over six years the government has 
been pushing companies to report. A survey of the top 200 
FTSE companies showed that 97 companies did not 
disclose any information on their social and environmental 
performance, that only 54 companies had produced 
stand-alone reports covering environmental and social 
issues and that only 16 companies said they would produce 
a report for the first time. Simon Propper, director of 
Environmental Context, said:
"It appears that companies resent attempts by Government to 
browbeat them into reporting. They see this as simply 
scratching the backs of the politicians and are calling the 
Government's bluff on threatened legislation. These 
companies don't yet recognise the many benefits, of taking 
the initiative and telling people what they are doing Jor the 
environment and society" (see
http ://\vww. econtext.co. uk/debate_files/uk_comp_rej 
ect.html).
The most recent report published by Environmental 
Context shows a significant increase in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) reporting on issues such as the 
environment, employee relations, respect for human rights 
and business ethics (Directions 2, Trends in Corporate 
Social Resposibility Reporting. 2001/2), Might this indicate 
a growing commitment to CSR and a growing recognition 
of the interests of stakeholders by companies? In recent 
years, much pressure has been exerted on companies to 
embrace CSR by the media, the public, by investors as well 
as shareholders themselves. It is hoped that we will, in the 
next few years, witness an increasing enthusiasm on the 11
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part of companies to make CSR more of a priority on their 
agendas. In the long run, this can only benefit the 
communities within which companies operate. For 
stakeholders and those who campaign for recognition of 
their interests, this may be the start of a new era.
STAKEHOLDERS AND DUTY OF 
DIRECTORS TO PROMOTE SUCCESS ^ •>
Under the new framework, the primary goal of 
directors is to promote the success of the company in the 
collective best interests of the shareholders; however, 
directors must take into account, where circumstances so 
require, non-shareholder interests when considering, in 
good faith, what will best promote the success of the 
company. This does not mean however, that these interests 
have an independent value! For example, promoting 
employee welfare is not an end in itself, but as a means to 
promoting shareholder welfare. The keyword is the 
"success of the company in the collective best interests of 
the shareholders." The duty is thus phrased in a way which 
is "encompassing" only of stakeholder interests; these are 
to be considered in order that directors may reach a 
properly calculated view required in the core part of their 
duty. In other words, consideration of matters affecting 
stakeholders is subordinate to that of the directors' 
primary goal to promote the success of the company.
The duty also only requires directors to consider non- 
shareholder interests where it is "practicable in the 
circumstances for him to identify". One can imagine that 
time constraints on directors or the non availability of 
information might be construed as circumstances where it 
was not practicable for them to take into account non- 
shareholder interests. It is debatable whether the new duty 
will, in real terms, actually improve die lot of company 
stakeholders.
OPERATING AND FINANCIAL REVIEW
In his speech, Stephen Byers MP clearly stressed it was 
impracticable to impose a specific duty on directors to take 
stakeholder interests into account. The way to ensure diat 
stakeholder interests were catered for, he said, was to focus 
on disclosure by companies of relevant issues. These could 
cover "relations with suppliers, customer complaints, 
employment policies, corporate governance, environmental, 
social and ethical policies where these are material to the 
business" and that "quality' rather than quantity of 
information was important so that shareholders, customers 
and other stakeholders can make informed decisions."
The Review consulted widely on this issue of disclosure. 
It recommended that all companies of significant 
economic size (the majority of public companies and large 
private companies) should produce, as part of their annual 
report and accounts, an operating and financial review 
(OFR) which would provide key information about the 
company. The objective behind die OFR is to ensure,
through transparency, responsible governance of 
companies with significant economic power (Final 
Report, 8.57). The OFR would be a qualitative, as well as 
financial, evaluation of performance, trends and 
intentions, prepared by the directors from their 
perspective as managers of the business and its purpose is 
to show, in the directors' own terms, what matters about the 
business as regards performance and direction (Final 
Report, 8.33: note the subjective content of the proposal).
"The requirement to produce an OFR would improve 
the quality, usefulness and relevance of information 
available to the markets and to everyone with an interest 
in the company... [it will] lead to improved 
understanding of business performance and prospects, as 
well as promoting accountability and encouraging 
responsiveness and high standards of business practice..." 
(Final Report, 3.34).
In making these recommendations, the Review waso '
motivated partly by the fact that stakeholders such as 
employees, customers and the community have a legitimate 
interest in the activities of the company (especially those 
wielding significant economic power) and should therefore 
have access to relevant information about the company if 
need be (Final Report, 3.28-3.30). Under the OFR, 
directors will provide an explanation to shareholders and 
others as to how they have looked after their social 
responsibilities, employees, the environment and the 
community (see, e.g., David R, "The perfect time for a 
thorough rethink of company law", The Times, July 25, 2002, 
p.26). The Government welcomed these recommendations 
in its White Paper (see Vol f, Pt 2, 4.28-4.41).
What kinds of information should the OFR contain? 
The White Paper, broadly following the recommendations 
of the Review, thought that in order to achieve the Review 
objective (see cl 73(3), Companies Bill) an OFR must 
contain at least the core elements:
(i) a statement of the company's business in the financial 
year to which the OFR relates,
(ii) a fair review of performance during that period and of 
the position of the company at the end of that period,
(iii) a fair projection of the prospects for the company's 
business and of events which will or may substantially 
affect that business (see cl 74, Companies Bill).
In addition, in forming an opinion as to whether the 
OFR achieved the Review objective, directors also have a 
duty to consider whether the inclusion of information 
about other matters is necessary. These include:
(1) the company's policies in relation to employment by 
the company,
(2) the company's policies on environmental issues 
relevant to the business,
(3) the company's policies on social and community issues
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relevant to the business and so on (see cl 75, 
Companies Bill).
For stakeholders, it is information in these categories 
which will be of particular significance and interest.
STAKEHOLDERS AND THE OFR
Given the new reporting obligations, one can expect 
useful information about the company's business in the 
OFR. Some of this information will concern stakeholders. 
Will preparing the OFR encourage directors to view the 
relationships between their companies and stakeholders 
from a fresh perspective? Will the reporting obligations 
under the new framework warrant stakeholders to expect 
that the company will take them more seriously? Lest we 
forget however, although directors have a duty to consider 
whether the inclusion of information about non- 
shareholder matters is necessary in order to achieve the 
Review objective, they do not have to include information 
on these matters if they did not think it was. It is therefore 
open to question whether in the end, there would be less, 
not more, information in a form that is useful in the OFR.
In embracing the OFR, the government may be seen as 
promoting CSR, helping to increase the number of 
companies to engage in CSR and deepening that 
engagement into something which influences all business 
activities instead of merely paying lip service to stakeholder 
interests. The criticism however, is that other than 
promoting disclosure of information by the company where 
relevant, it did not envisage strengthening the position of 
stakeholders in any other way To be sure, the OFR will be 
informative. It will enable shareholders and others to make 
a proper judgement about the company, assess the strategies 
it has adopted and consider the potential for successfully 
achieving these strategies. But should stakeholders be able 
to challenge the OFR if it contained sparse or vague 
information, or no information at all? What if they felt their 
interests and concerns have not been given proper attention 
(this could easily happen, as what is important to one group 
of stakeholders may differ significantly from what matters to 
another, for example, environmental pressure groups v 
company employees)? Several other questions come to 
mind. What form should the OFR take? How should it be 
presented so that it is clear and understandable? Does 
inclusion of any information in the OFR amount to a 
commitment to implement any strategies or promises on 
the part of directors?
Both the Review and the White Paper have tackled these 
concerns to some extent (see also the recent Financial
Services Authority Discussion Paper, "Review of the Listingj r ' o
regime", DP 14, which envisages a review (at para. 4.24) of 
how the quality of information given to the market by 
companies can be improved). To help stimulate discussion 
of how the OFR should be implemented, Annex D of the 
White Paper provided a commentary on a preliminary draft 
of the OFR. (White Paper, Pt 2, 4.33-4.34, Final Report,
3.41, 8.49 8.52). Important issues such as form, content 
and audit were addressed. To help directors prepare their 
OFRs, the Standards Board will draw up detailed rules for 
their compilation and directors will be able to obtain 
guidance on how to assess whether an item is material to 
their company and should therefore be included in the 
OFR. The White Paper also stated that companies which 
failed to provide the right quantity as well as quality of 
information would risk adverse comparison and questions 
from their shareholders and others (White Paper, Vol 1, Pt 
2, 4.33). Further, it envisaged that ultimately, and in the 
worst case scenario, directors may have to defend the 
process behind their reporting before the courts (White 
Paper, Vol 1, Pt 2, 4.33: see also the Final Report, 8.64-67, 
which elaborates on the power of the Reporting Review 
Panel to commence proceedings in court in respect of 
defective OFRs). Last but not least, the requirement that 
the OFR be audited by the company's auditors (see cl 81 , 
Companies Bill) should go some way (in theory!) toward 
ensuring that directors had thought long and hard about the 
nature of information included within it.
What is the next step? In embracing the OFR, the 
Government must ensure that directors are clear about its 
objectives; that to promote and improve transparency and 
accountability. Preparing the OFR must not be reduced to a 
cosmetic exercise with no real purpose. What use is the 
OFR if it was no more than just a legalistic document? 
Indeed both the Review and government were anxious to
o
avoid "boiler plate" and "box ticking" type reporting on the 
part of companies (White Paper, Annex D, "Draft clauses 
on the OFR" at 16). The OFR must be a meaningful7 o
document and a yardstick against which directors can 
properly be judged by shareholders and the wider 
community. The Government must bear this important 
factor in mind in preparing directors for their task ahead.
Careful thought must also be given to how directors can 
best address non-shareholder matters in the OFR. In 
forming an opinion as to whether or not the OFR will 
achieve its review objective, directors have a duty to 
consider whether inclusion of information on these 
matters is necessary. This is a subjective judgement. 
Proper direction must thus be given to directors to ensure 
that they have considered these matters carefully and have 
made an appropriate judgement as to their relevance. 
Stakeholders are important constituents within the 
company in their own right. Their livelihood is affected by 
company activity. Directors need to be sensitive to their 
needs. The guidance (and training?) directors will receive 
in the preparation of their OFRs must equip them to be 
insightful, receptive and responsible to a constituent of the 
company which so much depends, on its livelihood, on 
how the company is run and managed.  
Lilian Miles
School of Management, UMIST
With thanks to Ciiles Proctor, tr/io as u/uur.v has provided very useful
comments on im work. 13
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